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Does Paul Call Adam a “Type” of Christ?

An Exegetical Note on Romans 5,14


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It is well known that in Paul’s thought Adam is a “type” of Christ. Indeed, does Paul not say so explicitly in Rom 5,14, amidst an extended discussion of their parallel roles? Ἀδὰμ ὅς ἐστιν τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος. Well, not quite explicitly. The predicate of τύπος is not Ἀδάμ but the relative pronoun ὅς, and the referent of τοῦ μέλλοντος is not stated outright. Still, Paul’s meaning, most insist, is clear.¹

What remains open to debate, then, is only the precise signification of that heavily burdened term τύπος.

Of course, as with every phrase Paul wrote, alternative readings have occasionally been proffered, but these are generally dismissed out of hand, as “unlikely suggestions” that fail to warrant serious discussion. Nevertheless, since what interpreters find likely may have more to do with preconceptions regarding Paul’s typological imagination than with close reading of the passage, I offer here one more such suggestion – and one that has, I will argue, the considerable benefit of adhering more closely to Paul’s train of thought than does the dominant reading: Although Paul certainly views Adam as having an (antithetically) parallel role to that of Christ, he does not in fact call him a “type”. It is instead, I submit, Adam’s transgression that is deemed a τύπος in Rom 5,14. And it is not Christ, but rather the reality of willful post-law sin for which it is the model. Such a reading, we will see, makes good sense of the immediate context of the remark, and is not, despite the gender of the relative pronoun, so syntactically unlikely as has been assumed.

1 Transgression, Trespass, and Death in the Pre-Law Era

Paul introduces Adam in Rom 5,12 in order to establish what is initially meant to be the first half of a comparison. But the discussion quickly gets more involved than anticipated, and Paul breaks off to provide further explanation. The result is a typical Pauline anacoluthon: “Therefore, just as (ὥσπερ) sin came into the world through one man, and death came through sin, and so death spread to all because (ἐφ᾽ ᾧ) all have sinned – sin was indeed in the world before the law (ἄχρι νόμου) …” (NRSV). Leaving aside any discussion of the meaning of the

2 Jewett, Romans (see n. 1), 378. Cf. Fitzmyer, Romans (see n. 1), 418; F. Godet, Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, Grand Rapids 1956, 212–213.
controversial ἐφ᾽ ᾧ, it is enough to note here that Paul evidently sees the need further to clarify the pre-law (ἄχρι νόμου) status of sin and death.

Earlier in the letter, Paul had established the principle that “where there is no law, neither is there violation (παράβασις)” (4,15). Indeed, the function of the law, he had insisted, was not to make humans righteous, but rather to bring about knowledge (ἐπίγνωσις) of sin, thus silencing humanity before God’s just judgment (3,19–20). And so now Paul anticipates an objection:⁴ How could there be universal sin and death, as he has just claimed (5,12), where there was no law and hence no violation? Or, to put the question more pointedly: Did God act unjustly in the pre-law era, meting out punishment for sin – namely, death – upon those who had no ἐπίγνωσις of sin? In response, one might have expected Paul to revisit the discussion of law-less but culpable sin offered in ch. 1 (“they are without excuse”). Instead, after sharpening the question by introducing a key distinction between sin and “reckoned” sin,⁵ he simply points to the empirical fact of pre-law death: “Sin was indeed in the world before the law, but sin is not reckoned when there is no law. Yet death exercised dominion from Adam to Moses …” (5,13–14a). This is not an argument so much as a reiteration, and it leaves unclear the role of divine judgment in the case of “unreckoned” sin, but it will have to do.⁶

Again, then, death’s dominion was universal, despite the fact that God did not “reckon” pre-law sin. More precisely, Paul emphasizes that death had dominion “even over those whose sins were not like the transgression of Adam” (καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς μὴ ἁμαρτήσαντας ἐπὶ τῷ ὁμοιώματι τῆς παραβάσεως Ἀδὰμ [v. 14b]) – which invites the question, of course, in what sense the sins of these sinners differed from Adam’s transgression.⁷

There is widespread agreement that the explanatory key here is an implicit distinction between sin (ἁμαρτία) and transgression (παράβασις). Indeed, such

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⁴ See Brandenburger, Adam und Christus (see n. 1), 182–184; Jewett, Romans (see n. 1), 376–377. Cf. Bultmann, Adam and Christ (see n. 1), 153–154; Moo, Romans (see n. 1), 332.
⁵ On the analogy of ἐλογίσθη in Rom 4,3 and passim, I am inclined to read ἐλλογεῖται here as a divine passive, following Wilckens, Der Brief an die Römer (see n. 1), 318. Cf. Rom 4,8.
⁶ Or perhaps Paul’s point in vv. 13–14 is rather to demonstrate that Adam’s one-man transgression did indeed bring universal sin and death, which he does by adducing the fact that death reigned even in the era before sin was “reckoned” – that is, even in an era during which the cause of death could not be individual transgression. So H.A.W. Meyer, Critical and Exegetical Handbook to the Epistle to the Romans (KEK 4), New York 1884, 202–203. Note that such a reading demands the same distinction between ἁμαρτία and παράβασις as that offered below.
⁷ As the textual evidence indicates, some early readers simplified the passage considerably – but fully missed the point of Paul’s digression – by omitting the μή from v. 14. See Cranfield, Romans (see n. 1), 283 n. 1.
a distinction seems to be required by Paul’s otherwise contradictory statements regarding the pre-law existence of sin. Sin, Paul has just insisted, did exist prior to the coming of the law; transgression (παράβασις), he had stated in 4,15, did not. This is only explicable, I think, if we follow those commentators who take παράβασις to designate something more specific than ἁμαρτία, namely, the violation of an express command, such as did not exist in the era between Adam and Moses.⁸ Such an interpretation may appear to be overly nuanced, but in fact it fits the context well, since the contrast between ἁμαρτία and παράβασις would then serve as a near equivalent to the distinction just introduced between sin and “reckoned” sin. In sum, then, law-less ἁμαρτία is not “reckoned”; law-breaking παράβασις is.⁹

As Cranfield explains with characteristic clarity:

[The clause] is added in order to bring out the fact that those over whom sin reigned throughout this period were actually men who, while they had indeed sinned ... had not sinned after the likeness of Adam's transgression, that is, by disobeying a clear and definite divine commandment such as Adam had (Gen 2.17) and Israel was subsequently to have in the law.¹⁰

In other words, insofar as Adam had violated an express divine commandment, his sin was an advance instance, a precursor, of that kind of sin which was to appear with the coming of the law. And this, I submit, is precisely what Paul goes on to say: ὅς ἐστιν τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος – that is, “which [transgression] is a ‘type’ of what was to come”.

## 2 Advantages of the Proposed Reading

As I have already intimated, the chief advantage of the reading here proposed is the extent to which it accords with the argument of the passage as a whole. In particular, it takes the relative clause that ends v. 14 as a clarification of immediate relevance to the chief distinction with which vv. 13–14 have been concerned –

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⁸ So Cranfield, Romans (see n. 1), 283; Käsemann, Romans (see n. 1), 150; Godet, Romans (see n. 2), 212; Brandenburger, Adam und Christus (see n. 1), 190–192; J.A.T. Robinson, The Body: A Study in Pauline Theology (SBT 5), London 1952, 35 n. 1; P.J. Leithart, Adam, Moses, and Jesus: A Reading of Romans 5:12–14, CTJ 43 (2008) 257–273, esp. 272; J.D.G. Dunn, Romans (Word Biblical Commentary 38A), Vol. 1, Dallas 1988, 276; Fitzmyer, Romans (see n. 1), 418; K. Haacker, Exegetische Probleme des Römerbriefs, NT 20 (1978) 1–21, esp. 18.

⁹ Cf. Meyer, Romans (see n. 6), 203–205.

¹⁰ Cranfield, Romans (see n. 1), 283.
namely, that between pre-law “unreckoned” ἁμαρτία and willful “reckoned” παράβασις of God’s revealed law. Being pre-law (ἄχρι νόμου), but nevertheless willful transgression, Adam’s παράβασις is a potentially confusing exception to the rule and thus merits additional explanation. It was indeed willful transgression, Paul explains, even if, occurring before the coming of the law, it did not occur in the era of willful transgression. It was a τύπος of what was to come.

The same cannot be said of the dominant reading, which, though certainly in keeping with the general context – undoubtedly Adam and Christ are accorded parallel, if also antithetical¹¹ functions throughout the passage – must see v. 14c as merely an aside, irrelevant to the specific argument of vv. 13–14. Similarly, I would suggest that the proposed reading makes better sense than the dominant reading of the specific articulation of the antithetical parallel which follows in v. 15, since this does not, in fact, contrast Adam and Christ, as one would expect if they were in view in v. 14c,¹² but rather the trespass (παράπτωμα) and the gift (χάρισμα).¹³ In other words, here Paul is thinking not about Adam but about Adam’s transgression (cf. 5,12), which he contrasts, here as throughout the verses that follow, with God’s free gift (χάρις, δωρεά, δώρημα).

Notice again the structure of the argument: In v. 14a–b, Paul refers to the likeness not of Adam himself but of his transgression; in v. 15 he goes on to contrast not Adam but his trespass with God’s gift. To interpose a reference to Adam himself in v. 14c is thus to disrupt what is otherwise a continuous flow of argument.

3 Syntactical Analogies

If the reading I have proposed fits well the context of the clause, still the question remains whether it is a credible account of its syntax. The principle question, of course, is this: Can the antecedent of the (masculine) ὅς be the (feminine) παράβασις?

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¹¹ As K.-H. Ostmeyer has noted, here already we have a significant problem with the prevailing interpretation, which sees a typological relationship between Adam and Christ: “Ein antithetisches τύπος-Verständnis jedoch wäre singulär, und man müßte Paulus den Vorwurf machen, an zentraler Stelle einen unpassenden und mißverständlichen Begriff verwendet zu haben” (Typologie und Typos. Analyse eines schwierigen Verhältnisses, NTS 46 [2000] 122–131, here 127).

¹² Cf. Bultmann, Adam and Christ (see n. 1), 155.

¹³ So, rightly, D.P. Seemuth, Adam the Sinner and Christ the Righteous One: The Theological and Exegetical Substructure of Romans 5:12–21 (Ph.D. diss.), Marquette University 1989, 221–222.
There is of course no reason to imagine that Ἀδάμ must be the antecedent of the relative pronoun simply because of the word’s immediate proximity. One has only to read the first few verses of Romans to see that the antecedent of a relative pronoun in Paul, as elsewhere, is often enough not the genitive which concludes the previous clause but rather the noun it modifies: εὐαγγέλιον θεοῦ, ὁ προεπηγγείλατο (1,1–2); Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν, δι’ οὗ ἐλάβομεν χάριν (1,4–5).

A more serious objection, of course, concerns the lack of agreement in gender. But the syntax is not unequivocal. Although it is true that the relative pronoun will generally agree with its antecedent, it can also be “assimilated in gender to the predicate substantive.” As W.E. Jelf noted, such usage occurs principally with verbs of being, calling, or being called – so, for example: λόγοι μήν εἰσιν ἐν ἕκαστοις ἡμῶν, ὃς ἐλπίδας ὀνομάζομεν (Plato, Phileb. 40a). And this is precisely what Bengel suggested with regard to Rom 5,14: ὃς is masculine not because it has Ἀδάμ as an antecedent, but because it has been attracted to τύπος.

In a thorough study of the relative pronoun in the NT, J. Boyer identifies nine instances of such attraction to the gender of the predicate substantive – though, by my judgment, in only three or four cases is this the only plausible explanation for the syntax: τὴν μάχαιραν τοῦ πνεύματος, ὃ ἐστιν ῥῆμα θεοῦ (Eph 6,17); ἐν οἴκῳ 14

14 *Pace* Meyer, Romans (see n. 6), 206.
15 According to the statistical analysis of J. Boyer (Relative Clauses in the Greek New Testament: A Statistical Study, GTJ 9 [1988] 233–256, esp. 244–245), of those antecedents in the NT that precede the relative pronoun, only 39% are the immediately preceding word.
17 Jelf, Grammar (see n. 16), § 821.3. Jelf also cites Herodotus, Hist. 2,174; 5,108,2; 7,54,2; Plato, Phaedr. 255C; Demosthenes, 3 Aphob. 31.
18 J.A. Bengel, Gnomon of the New Testament, Edinburgh 1873, 3,70. So also J.B. Koppe, Novum Testamentum Graece: perpetua annotatione illustratum, Göttingen 1791–1828, 4,110. Note that Bengel himself did not consider the possibility that the antecedent of ὃς here might be Adam’s παράβασις. He argued, rather, that ὃς should be translated as neuter (“which thing”), referring more generally to the pre-law situation that Paul describes. Meyer (Romans [see n. 6], 206) deems this reading grammatically tenable, though he does not himself endorse it.
19 Boyer, Relative Clauses (see n. 15), 246. Mark 7,11 and (perhaps) 15,16,42 are better explained as instances of what Boyer refers to as the use of a “translation formula”; Gal 3,16 is likely a case of *ad sensum* agreement, where the pronoun is influenced by the real gender of the referent; 2Thess 3,17 is more aptly described as what Boyer calls a “neuter of general notion”. The feminine relative pronoun in Rev 5,8 is amphibolous: Perhaps it is the bowls (φιάλας) full of incense
Certainly, then, the construction is not common, but neither is it impossible.

It is worth noting here that what each of these examples has in common, besides the syntactical quirk in question, is that the relative clause provides an explanatory gloss – that is, it decodes an allegory or provides interpretive insight into the nature of the antecedent. This is the basic function of the clause in Rom 5,14 as well. And, notably, it is in just such a context that such usage recurs also in the letters of Ignatius and Polycarp, as well as the *Epistle of Barnabas*.²¹ I reproduce here just one example: τῆς μηχανῆς Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, ὃς ἐστιν σταυρός (Ign. Eph. 9,1).

In the context of our discussion, what makes Ignatius's construction particularly noteworthy is the potential ambiguity that results from the proximity of the relative pronoun to a noun with which it agrees in gender and number, but which is not, in fact, the antecedent. Indeed, were one to attend only to syntactical probability, one would deem it far more likely that the antecedent of σταυρός were Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ than τῆς μηχανῆς. In this case, then, what is decisive in the interpretation of the clause is not syntax, which discourages the correct reading, but sense, which demands it.

I suggest that the same is true with regard to Rom 5,14: τῷ ὁμοιώματι τῆς παραβάσεως Ἀδὰμ ὁς ἐστιν τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος. Certainly the most likely reading of the syntax is, as in our Ignatian example, to take the immediately preceding noun, which matches the relative pronoun in gender and number, as its antecedent. But, as noted above, this interpretation renders the clause an awkward and unnecessary aside, whereas taking τῆς παραβάσεως as the antecedent results in a compelling continuation of Paul's line of thought. Further, this latter reading preserves a meaningful relationship between the closely complementary ideas represented by ὁμοίωμα and τύπος: If certain sin is in the likeness (ὁμοίωμα) of Adam's sin, it follows, of course, that Adam's sin is the model or archetype (τύπος) – the stamp, so to speak, that struck the imprint.

²⁰ In Rev 4,5, a variant reading has the relative pronoun agree instead with the antecedent. Cf. Col 1,27; Eph 1,13; 2Thess 3,17.

²¹ Ign. Eph. 9,1; 18,1; 20,2; Ign. Rom. 5,1; Pol. Phil. 1,1; Barn. 16,9. Cf. Philo, Leg. All. 3,45.
4 Τοῦ μέλλοντος

If I am correct, though, and it is Adam’s παράβασις that is in view here, what are we to make of the final phrase? Can τοῦ μέλλοντος be taken as signifying anything other than Christ? In fact, on this matter, in contrast to the all but universal agreement on the interpretation of ὅς, there has been a thin but steady stream of justifiable dissent.²² After all, as Cranfield rightly insists, despite its resemblance to ὁ ἐρχόμενος (Matt 11,3; Lk 7,20), there is no evidence that one should impute any technical messianic significance to Paul’s phrase here.²³ And neither are there syntactical grounds for dismissing the interpretation, suggested some decades ago by J. Robinson and championed by R. Scroggs, that the phrase in fact refers to Moses.²⁴

Robinson’s suggestion has not gained much of a following. It is, most seem to agree, somewhat awkward, requiring that we overlook the rather significant difference between one who breaks a command and one through whom a command is given. And Robinson himself seems to have recognized this, for, in a subsequent discussion, he highlighted instead two other possibilities his initial treatment had raised: first, that τοῦ μέλλοντος refers not to Moses per se but to “the man of the future, Mosaic man” – that is, “man under law” and hence susceptible not only to sin in general (ἁμαρτία) but also to willful transgression (παράβασις); and, second, that τοῦ μέλλοντος should be taken not as masculine but as neuter, and that it refers, as the phrase often does, simply to “the future”.²⁵

Both of these readings are defensible. If, as most assume, it is Adam who is deemed a τύπος here, it is perhaps sensible enough to seek, presuming that Paul is sensitive to symmetry, a personal referent for τοῦ μέλλοντος that allows one to construe the participle as masculine. None fits the context of the passage so well as Robinson’s “man under law”. But, in light of the argument above that it is not Ἀδὰμ but his παράβασις that is the antecedent of ὅς, it is Robinson’s final suggestion, largely ignored by subsequent interpreters, that I would like to take up here: Paul is speaking, simply enough, of the future reality, τὸ μέλλον, that Adam’s sin

²² Notable are Bengel, Gnomon (see n. 18), 3,70; Robinson, The Body (see n. 8), 35 n. 1; R. Scroggs, The Last Adam: A Study in Pauline Anthropology, Philadelphia 1966, 80–81; Haacker, Exegetische Probleme des Römerbriefs (see n. 8), 16–19; Biju-Duval, Traduzione (see n. 3).
²³ Cranfield, Romans (see n. 1), 283. Likewise also Käsemann, Romans (see n. 1), 151; Biju-Duval, Traduzione (see n. 3), 355.
²⁴ Robinson, The Body (see n. 8), 35 n. 1; Scroggs, Last Adam (see n. 22), 81.
prefigures\textsuperscript{26} – namely, a reality characterized by transgression of express divine commands.

Not only does this reading preserve intact the flow of Paul’s thought in the passage, but it also stands on very firm lexical ground. Hardly a novel expression, the arthrous neuter participle τὸ μέλλον is an extremely common way to designate “the future” or “things to come”,\textsuperscript{27} and it appears often enough with this sense in the genitive.\textsuperscript{28} If, then, as is the case here, there is no likely referent for the phrase in the immediate context, it makes little sense to hunt for an implicit one\textsuperscript{29} – let alone to import one from 1Cor 15,45 and supply a final Ἀδάμ.\textsuperscript{30} On the contrary, the ordinary substantive “what is to come” is surely the most credible reading of the phrase. What Paul is saying, then, is that Adam’s transgression is a “type” of what was to come with the revelation of the law – namely, as he has been at pains to demonstrate, its willful violation.

5 Conclusion

I conclude with a few comments on the implications of this proposal. On this reading of Rom 5,14, what is gained, we might ask, and what is lost? Apart from simply a more satisfactory account of the text, the chief gain, I would suggest, is a clearer view of Paul’s take on the complex of relationships among law, sin, judgment, and death. Specifically, this interpretation brings Paul’s negotiation of the dilemma of pre-law sin and its consequences into sharper focus: Although there is no transgression (παράβασις) where there is no law (4,15), and therefore

\textsuperscript{26} So also Bengel, Gnomon (see n. 18), 3,70; Haacker, Exegetische Probleme des Römerbriefs (see n. 8), 18; Biju-Duval, Traduzione (see n. 3), 355–358.

\textsuperscript{27} H.J. Liddell / R. Scott / H.S. Jones, A Greek-English Lexicon, Oxford 1940, s.v. μέλλω, IV.

\textsuperscript{28} For only a few of an endless supply of examples, see Plato, Theaet. 178E; Thucydides 1,138,3; 3,44,3; Xenophon, Cyr. 3,2,15; Demosthenes, Fals. leg. 122; Aristotle, Top. 111b; Polybius 2,60,6; 3,31,3; Diodorus Siculus 12,52,2; 19,72,6; Plutarch, Sol. 12,10; Caes. 63,11; 69,7; Josephus, Ant. 4,150; 13,431; Philo, Ios. 162; Mos. 1,12; 2,145; Spec. Leg. 2,187; 4,213; Virt. 152; Flacc. 129; Legat. 259,322; Hypoth. 6,4.

\textsuperscript{29} As Biju-Duval notes (Traduzione [see n. 3], 356), if Paul had meant “Christ” here, there is no reason why he should not have said so explicitly.

\textsuperscript{30} So, rightly, Cranfield, Romans (see n. 1), 283 n. 3. Pace Ostmeyer (Typologie und Typos [see n. 11], 128 n. 71), it is helpful to remind ourselves that, not having 1Cor 15 to fall back on, Paul’s Roman addressees would have had to interpret the phrase on the basis of its immediate context. And although Adam and Christ – or, rather, their contrasting contributions to salvation history – are indeed set alongside each other in vv. 15–21, there simply is no “second Adam” in view here.
sin is not “reckoned” (5,13), nevertheless sin and death exercise dominion apart from law. Why? Because Adam’s sin, which is indeed παράβασις – the archetypal παράβασις, one might say – has let loose the power of sin (cf. 3,9). The role of God’s judgment in all this is not specified. One can perhaps infer from ch. 1 that it consists in God’s handing humanity over into sin’s power, but how this might relate to God’s not “reckoning” pre-law sin remains unclear.

What is lost, of course, is the most explicit Pauline occurrence of typological interpretation. I do not intend to wade too deeply here into the ongoing discussion of the nature of Paul’s use of scripture. I would only note that, if my reading of Rom 5,14 is correct, although the word τύπος certainly appears here in a hermeneutical context, it in fact has no technical hermeneutical sense. Its force, instead, is essentially taxonomic, as Paul’s use of the complementary term ὁμοίωμα suggests: Adam’s sin belongs to the same likeness or category as the willful law-breaking transgressions to come, and, being the first such instance, it sets for them a pattern. Perhaps this may, loosely speaking, be called typological interpretation, but it does not very much resemble what one finds, say, in the Epistle of Barnabas. And, since Paul nowhere else refers to an OT character as a “type”, or, indeed, uses the term τύπος with a specifically hermeneutical sense, it would be perilous solely on the basis of his usage in Rom 5,14 to make Paul the father of the technical sense of the term, or of the typological interpretive tradition that was later to flourish.

31 Cf. Ostmeyer, Typologie und Typos (see n. 11), 129.
32 As Ostmeyer (Typologie und Typos [see n. 11], esp. 115–129) has cogently argued, “ein besonderes ‘hermeneutisches Verständnis’ des Begriffes begegnet weder im NT noch in der frühchristlichen Literatur” (129). See also Ostmeyer, Taufe und Typos. Elemente und Theologie der Tauftypologien in 1. Korinther 10 und 1. Petrus 3 (WUNT II.118), Tübingen 2000, 9–52. According to L. Goppelt (Typos [see n. 1], 4–5; Art. τύπος κτλ., TDNT 8, 246–259, esp. 248), in just two Pauline texts (Rom 5,14; 1Cor 10,6) – and never before Paul – does the word τύπος appear with the hermeneutical signification it later would come to have. But the appearance of τύπος and τυπικῶς in 1Cor 10,6.11 is easily explicable by analogy to Paul’s usage in Phil 3,17 and 1Thess 1,7, where the term refers to a moral example. Cf. Biju-Duval, Traduzione (see n. 3), 356–357; J.W. Aageson, Typology, Correspondence, and the Application of Scripture in Romans 9–11, JSNT 31 (1987) 51–72, esp. 52–53.
33 So Goppelt, Typos (see n. 1), 4–5.